State-space and action representations form the building blocks of decision-making processes in the brain; 9 states map external cues to the current situation of the agent whereas actions provide the set of motor commands 10 from which the agent can choose to achieve specific goals. Although these factors differ across environments, it is 11 not currently known whether or how accurately state and action representations are acquired by the agent because 12 previous experiments have typically provided this information a priori through instruction or pre-training. Here 13 we show that, in the absence of such a priori knowledge, state and action representations adapt to reflect the 14 structure of the world. We used a sequential decision-making task in rats in which they were required to pass 15 through multiple states before reaching the goal, and for which the number of states and how they map onto 16 external cues were not known a priori. We found that, early in training, animals selected actions as if the task was 17 not sequential and outcomes were the immediate consequence of the most proximal action. During the course of 18 training, however, rats recovered the true structure of the environment and made decisions based on the expanded 19 state-space, reflecting the multiple stages of the task. We found a similar pattern with actions; early in training 20 animals only considered the execution of single actions whereas, after training, they created useful action sequences 21 that expanded the set of available actions. We conclude that the profile of choices shows a gradual shift from 22 simple representations of actions and states to more complex structures compatible with the structure of the world. 23 1 Introduction 24
. Different phases of the experiment. The experiment started with two magazine training sessions (phase 1), followed by several lever training sessions (phase 2), in which animals learned that pressing each lever (left and right levers corresponding to 'L' and 'R' in the figure) would delivered a reward (presented by 'O' in the figure). The next phase was discrimination training (phase 3), in which animals learned that when stimulus S1 was presented action 'L' should be taken to earn a reward, and when S2 was presented action 'R' should be taken to earn a reward. S1 and S2 were a constant and blinking house light, respectively. The next phase of the experiment was two-stage training, in which animals were trained on a two-stage decision-making task. This training phase comprised multiple training sessions and, in the middle or at the end of these training sessions, several 'probe sessions' were inserted. The flow of events in the two-stage task. Trials started in state S0, which was signalled by the absence of the house light. After an action ('L' or 'R') was taken at stage 1, either constant or blinking house light started (S1 or S2). Next, subjects could take another action at stage 2 ('L' or 'R'), which could lead either to the delivery of the outcome or to no outcome. Actions taken in S0 immediately lead to the presentation of either S1 or S2, and actions taken in S1 or S2 immediately lead to the outcome or no outcome. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was zero in this experiment, but in the experiments reported in the Supplementary Materials, it was greater than zero, as detailed in Supplementary Materials. (b) The structure of the task. Stage 1 actions in S0 led to the stage 2 stimuli (S1/S2) in a deterministic manner. The rewarding stage 2 state changed with a probability of 0.14 after earning an outcome (indicated by 'reversal' in the graph). 'O' represents outcome, and 'X' no-outcome. (c) The structure of the probe sessions. The Probe sessions were similar to the training sessions (panel (b)), except that stage 1 actions led to the stage 2 states in a probabilistic manner. Taking action 'L' led to state S2 commonly (80% of the time), and to state S1 rarely (dashed lines). Taking action 'R' led to state S1 commonly (80% of the time), and to state S2 rarely (dashed lines). The stage 2 state that earned reward changed over time and, as such, subjects needed to use feedback from the 71 previous trial to track which specific stage 2 state was rewarded so as to take the stage 1 action leading to that state. 72 Table 1 . Four hypotheses about state-space and action representations. (a) The state-space constitutes a single stage (outcomes such as food pellets are not shown here as states), and 'L' and 'R' are the only possible actions that the subject considers taking. (b) The state-space matches the correct state-space of the task, and the actions are 'L' and 'R'. (c) The state-space only consists of state S0, and actions are 'L → R' and 'R → L'. Note that single actions 'R' and 'L' are not included. (d) The state-space represents the two stages of the task and actions include both single actions and action sequences. representation (a) (b) (c) (d) state-space S0/S1/S2 S0, S1, S2 S0 S0, S1, S2 actions L, R Figure 3 .
(a) Odds ratio of staying on the same stage 1 action after getting rewarded on the previous trial over the odds ratio after not getting rewarded. The dotted line represents the indifference point (equal probability of staying on the same stage 1 action after reward or no reward). Each bar represents the odds ratio for a single training session. In the sessions marked with '#' in Figure 3a the contingency between stage 1 actions and stage 2 states were revered ('L' leads to S1 and 'R' to S2). 'Strict sequence' refers to sessions in which a trial was aborted if the animal entered the magazine between stage 1 and stage 2 actions. (b) Reaction times (RT) averaged over subjects. RT refers to the delay between performing the stage 1 and stage 2 actions. Each dot represents a training session. (c) An example of how the performance of action sequences can be detected in the probe session. On a certain trial a rat has earned a reward by taking 'L' at stage 1 and 'R' at stage 2. The subject then repeats the whole action sequence ('L' and then 'R'), even though after executing 'L' it ends up in S1 (due to a rare transition) and action 'R' is never rewarded in that state. (d) The probability of staying on the same stage 2 action in the probe session averaged over subjects, as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward) and whether subjects stayed on the same stage 1 action (stay/switch). (e) The probability of staying on the same stage 1 action in the probe session averaged over subjects as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward) and whether the transition in the previous trial was common or rare. (f) Simulation of stage 2 choices, and (g) stage 1 choices using the best-fitted parameters for each subject. Error bars represent ±1 SEM. 6/36 different from that of the previous trial. As the figure shows, if the previous trial is rewarded ('reward' condition) and 141 subjects stay on the same stage 1 action ('stay' condition) then there is a high chance that they will also repeat the 142 same stage 2 action, indicating that they are repeating the whole previously rewarded action sequence. This is 143 supported by a significant interaction between staying on the same stage 1 action and reward on the previous trial 144 (β = 0.494 (CI: 0.055, 0.933), SE=0.224, p = 0.027; see Table 2 :stage 2 for the full analysis). Therefore, the pattern of 145 choices at stage 2 is consistent with the suggestion that the subjects have expanded the initial set of actions, that 146 previously only included actions 'L' and 'R' (Table 1a) , to a more complex set that includes action sequences 'L→R' 147 and 'R→L' (Table 1c) . The analysis provided in the previous section showed that acquiring either the state-space representation or action 150 sequences can explain the pattern of choices observed during the course of training ( Figure 3a ). Furthermore, the 151 pattern of choices at stage 2 of the probe session provided evidence that the subjects are using action sequences. It 152 remains open to question, therefore, whether the rats are exclusively solving the task using action sequences without 153 relying on the state-space of the task (Table 1c ), or are using both an expanded state-space and action 154 representations for decision-making (Table 1d ). To answer this question we looked at the pattern of choices at stage 1 155 of the probe session.
156
As argued in the previous sections, if decisions are based on the true state-space of the task then we expect that, 157
after earning reward on a trial, the same stage 1 action will be taken on the next trial. The same is not true for the 158 trials with rare transitions in the probe session, however. This is because, if the reward was earned on a trial with a 159 rare transition, the subjects should then switch to the other stage 1 action on the next trial if they are using their 160 knowledge of the state-space of the task (Daw et al., 2011) . For example, imagine it is a trial with a rare transition 161 and the rat, by taking 'L', is transferred to state S1 and earns reward. On the next trial, using the state-space of the 162 task, the rat should switch to 'R' at stage 1 because 'R' is the stage 1 action that commonly (80% of time) leads to 163 S1. As a consequence, staying on the same stage 1 action after earning reward depends both on the reward and the 164 transition type on the previous trial.
165
On the other hand, if the rats are exclusively using action sequences without relying on the state-space of the task 166 Table 2 . Results of the logistic regression analysis of stage 1 and stage 2 choices in the probe session. For the stage 1 choices, the analysis focused on staying on the same stage 1 action on the next trial, based on whether the previous trial was rewarded and whether it was common or rare (trans). 'reward:transition' is the interaction between reward, and transition type. For stage 2 choices, the analysis focused on staying on the same stage 2 action, based on staying on the same stage 1 action (stay) and earning a reward on the previous trial. (Table 1c) , then staying on the same stage 1 action only requires that the previous trial was rewarded; the transition 167 type of the previous trial should not have any effect. This is because earning reward by executing an action sequence 168 will result in the same action sequence being repeated on the next trial (and so the same stage 1 action) irrespective 169 of the transition type on the previous trial. Therefore, a main effect of reward on staying on the same stage 1 action 170 in the next trial indicates that the subjects are using action sequences whereas, an interaction between reward and 171 transition type on the previous trial indicates that the subjects are using the true state-space of the task.
Importantly, the results of stage 1 actions, presented in Figure 3e , clearly revealed a significant reward-transition 173 interaction ( Table 2 :stage 1), indicating that the subjects were using the correct state-space of the task (Table 1b) . In 174 addition, the main effect of reward was also significant, which indicates that the subjects were also using action 175 sequences (Table 1c ). As such the pattern of choices indicates that the rats were using both action sequences and 176 single actions guided by the true state-space of the task. Therefore, evidence from this study suggests that, as 177 training progressed, the initially simple state-space and action representations (Table 2a ) were expanded to align with 178 the true structure of the task (Table 2d ).
179
Note that there are other explanations for the main effect of reward, other than using action sequences. For 180 example, it could be the case that after experiencing a rare transition, subjects presumed that the relationship 181 between stage 1 actions and stage 2 states had switched, which predicts a main effect of reward on staying on the 182 same stage 1 action even if subjects are not using action sequences. Another explanation for the main effect of reward 183 is based on the notion of 'model-free' actions. Intuitively, it implies that earning reward after taking an action 184 increases the chance of repeating the action. In this task, it implies that reward increases the chance of taking the 185 same stage 1 action in the next trial whether the experienced transition was common or rare (Daw et al., 2011) .
186
Nevertheless, although these two accounts can predict a main effect of reward, they do not predict nor can they 187 explain the effect observed on the stage 2 actions. As a consequence, we interpret the main affect of reward as 188 indictating that the rats were using action sequences, which can explain both the stage 1 and stage 2 actions taken by 189 the rats (see Discussion for further details).
190

Potential effects of latent states and action biases 191
In the previous section, we argued that the reward-transition interaction is a sign the animals had acquired an 192 adaptive state-space representation, which allowed them to learn the relationship between stage 1 actions and state 2 193 states. However, recently, Akam et al. (2015) argued that this form of reward-transition interaction in multistage 194 decision-making can be explained if subjects have learned the 'latent states' of the task without relying on the 195 relationship between stage 1 actions and stage 2 states. On this account, the rats simply learned a kind of rule: e.g., 196
whenever a reward is earned in S1, perform 'R' on the next trial (at stage 1), and whenever a reward is earned from 197 S2, perform 'L' on the next trial. Akam et al. (2015) argue that this process requires the subjects to expand their imply repeating the previously rewarded sequence of actions in S0 and S1/S2.
207
There is another potential interpretation of the reward-transition interaction based on the potential for a local 208 response bias induced by the reward function. Assume that, in a part of the probe session, actions taken in S1 are 209 rewarded (and actions taken in S2 are not), and by trial and error the animal develops a tendency to take action 'R' 210 more frequently than 'L' at S0; i.e., the probability of staying on the same action when it is 'R' is higher than when it 211 is 'L'. As most of the common transitions after taking 'R' are rewarded (as they mostly lead to S1) and most of the 212 rare transitions are non-rewarded (as they mostly lead to S2), there will be an effect of reward-transition interaction 213 on the probability of staying on the same action, which looks like the animals are taking the structure of the world 214 into account, while what they are doing is simply taking action 'R' more frequently. This issue was discussed in 1 action. This new predictor encodes whether the previous stage 1 action was the best action, i.e., it leads to the 218 stage 2 state with the highest reward, which will absorb the effect of the reward-transition interaction if the 219 interaction is just due to repeating the best action more frequently (Smittenaar et al., 2013; Akam et al., 2015) . This 220 analysis is presented in Table A4 , which shows that even in the presence of this predictor the effect of reward and the 221 reward-transition interaction are still significant. As such, the reward-transition interaction is unlikely to be due to 222 this form of response bias. Animals were given three probe sessions in total, and the results reported above were taken from the last of these 225 tests which was the final experimental session (probe sessions are marked by an asterisk in Figure 3e ). The full 226 analysis of all the probe sessions is presented in see Table A3 in Supplementary Materials. The structure of the probe 227 sessions was identical to each other and also in terms of results; similar to the third probe session analysed above, the 228 main effect of reward was significant in sessions one and two. However, unlike the last probe session, in the first two 229 sessions, the rats did not show evidence that they were using action sequences (Table A3 : probe 1 and 2, stage 2 230 actions; reward-stay interaction; p-value>0.1). A closer examination of these sessions revealed that, at this stage in 231 the training, the rats were not discriminating between the stage 2 stimuli; i.e., because the analysis of stage 2 only 232 included trials in which the stage 2 state is different from the previous trial, we expected the probability of staying on 233 the same stage 2 action to be generally low (as different actions are rewarded in the stage 2 states), which was not 234 the case in the first two probe sessions (see Table A3 ; p-value > 0.05 for the intercept term at stage 2 actions in 235 probe 1, 2). As a consequence, under these conditions, staying on the wrong stage 2 action due to the performance of 236 action sequences cannot be detected, because the rats are likely to take the incorrect action at stage 2 states even if 237 they are not taking an action sequence. One reason for this lack of discrimination is the potential for interference 238 between the stage 1 and stage 2 actions; if the rats checked the magazine after taking the stage 1 action they may 239 then have repeated the same stage 1 action instead of taking the correct stage 2 action. This would make it look like 240 9/36 the animals were not discriminating between stage 2 stimuli. To address this issue we introduced the 'strict sequences' 241 criterion for the next ten training sessions ( Figure 3e ) under which a trial was aborted if a rat entered the magazine 242 between the stage 1 and stage 2 actions. After these ten training sessions the rats were given the third probe test, in 243 which they showed they were able significantly to discriminate between the stage 2 states (see Table 2 ; 244 p-value = 0.001 for the intercept term at stage 2 actions). Note that the analysis presented in the previous and 245 subsequent sections relates to this last probe session.
246
In Supplementary Materials, we also present three supplemental experiments each of which used different 247 parameters. Supplementary experiment 1, which is shown in Figure A3 However, in none of these experiments were we able to observed the performance of action sequences, as indicated by 251 the reward-same interaction in stage 2 actions (see Table A5 for the full analysis of supplementary experiment 1 and 252 Table A6 for the full analysis of supplementary experiments 2,3). One main difference between these experiments and 253 the experiment reported in the main paper is that, whereas in the main experiment the ITI was zero, in the 254 supplementary experiments, the inter-trial interval was non-zero. In this latter condition, animals were often found to 255 take actions during the ITI, which were not rewarded but which were very likely to interfere with the performance of 256 action sequences once the next trial started. Using an ITI of zero addressed this issue. Lastly, as Figure 3a shows, 257 there were some training sessions in which the contingency between stage 1 actions and stage 2 states was reversed. 258
These training sessions were introduced to overcome the interference that has been argued to be produced when 259 animals, including humans, are first exposed to rare trails. 260 2.6 Computational models of adaptive decision-making 261 We next sought to establish the computational model that best characterized the decision-making process used by the 262 rats in this experiment. The modelling was focused on the probe session that we analysed in the previous sections 263 (the final probe session). For this purpose, we compared different families of reinforcement-learning (RL) model to 264 establish which provided a better explanation for the data (Table 3 ). The families compared included: (1) a 265 non-hierarchical model-based RL family (MB) corresponding to Table 1b , which assumes that the subjects acquired 266 the correct state-space of the task, but in which action sequences were not included in the set of actions;
(2) a 267 hierarchical RL family (H) corresponding to Table 1c , which assumes that the set of actions included only action 268 sequences, but that decisions were not guided by the true state-space of the task; (3) a hierarchical model-based RL 269 family (H-MB) corresponding to Table 1d , which assumes that the subjects were using single actions, action sequences 270 and the true state-space representation for decision-making (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2013); (4) a model-free RL family 271 (MF), and (5) a hybrid model-based RL and model-free RL family (MB-MF). These latter two families have been 272 previously used to characterise performance on a similar task (Daw et al., 2011), and we used them as baselines.
273
In total we considered 344 different models in which each family consisted of several members with different 274 degrees of freedom (see Supplementary Materials for details). We then calculated the negative log model-evidence for 275 each model M given the choices of subjects, D (denoted by − log p(D|M )). Table 3 shows the negative log 1961). Therefore, the above results provide strong evidence that the subjects were utilising H-MB to guide action 280 selection. Figure 4 shows the negative log model-evidence for the best eight models in each family and shows that the 281 different members of the H-MB family provide a better explanation of the data than any of the other families.
282
We then simulated eight instances of the H-MB model of the task using the best fitting parameters for each 283 subject (Table A2) interaction between earning a reward on the previous trial and the likelihood of staying on the same stage 1 action 288 (β = 0.259 (CI: 0.166, 0.353), SE=0.047, p < 10 −7 ). These results are, therefore, entirely consistent with the 289 behavioural results of our experiments using rats as subjects. Furthermore, the fact that H-MB family provides a 290 better fit than the H family implies that subjects were using the correct state-space of the task (MB part), and the 291 H-MB family being better than MB family implies that subjects were using action sequences. The H-MB family also 292 provided a better fit than baseline MB/MF models, however, this does not imply that some form of model-free RL is 293 not working concurrently with a H-MB model, as we discuss in the next sections. Learning the value of different actions in various states of the environment is essential for decision-making in 296 multi-stage environments. This learning process operates above the state-space and action representation and, 297 therefore, the ability to (i) acquire the correct state-space of the task, and (ii) create new actions that are useful for 298 solving the task, are important for efficient decision-making. Using a sequential decision-making task in rats, we 299 11/36 provide direct evidence that, early in training, subjects make decisions based on simple state-space and action representations, but that, during the course of training, both state-space and action representations evolve and adapt 301 session on the left lever and one session on the right lever each day for four days with the total number of outcomes 372 each day limited to 60 per session ( Figure 1 :phase 2). The total duration of each session was limited to 60 minutes. 373
Next, rats were trained to discriminate the two stimuli ( Figure 1 :phase 3). Each session started with the presentation 374 of a stimulus. The stimulus was presented until the rat performed an action (either pressing the left or right lever) 375
after which the stimulus turned off. For one stimulus, taking the left action led to the reward, whereas for the other 376 stimulus taking the right action led to reward. Levers and stimuli were counterbalanced across subjects. After an 377 action was chosen, there was a 60-second inter-trial interval (ITI) after which the next trial started with the 378 presentation of the next stimulus, again chosen randomly. The duration of each session was 90 minutes, with no limit 379 on the maximum number of earned rewards. The stimuli were a constant or a blinking house light (5 Hz). The result 380 of this phase is depicted in Figure A2 .
381
The rats then received training on the two-stage task depicted in Figure 2b (maximum 60 outcomes in a session 382
and maximum duration of a session was limited to 1 hour). Animals were trained on the two-stage task for 40 383 sessions. In the middle of, or at the end of these training sessions, they were given probe sessions, similar to the 384 training sessions except that stage 1 actions led to stage 2 states in a probabilistic manner ( Figure 2c ). These sessions 385 are indicated by '*' in Figure 3a . After the first two training sessions, subjects then received ten more training 386 sessions, and were then given a further probe test. The results reported in the Results section correspond to this last 387 probe session. In the sessions marked with '#' in Figure 3a the contingency between stage 1 actions and stage 2 388 states were revered ('L' leads to S1 and 'R' to S2); these training sessions were followed by a session in which 'L' 389 leads to S1 and 'R' to S2 in 20% of times, followed by normal training sessions, as Figure 3a shows. Finally, 'strict 390 sequence' in Figure 3a refers to a session in which a trial was aborted if the animal entered the magazine between 391 stage 1 and stage 2 actions. In all the training phases levers were present throughout the training session. analysis. In all of the analyses, logistic regression was used and all the fixed effects (including intercepts) were treated 395 as random effects varying across subjects. For analyses that included more than one session, random effects were 396 assumed to vary across sessions and subjects in a nested manner. Confidence intervals (CI) of the estimates were 397 calculated using the 'confint' method of lme4 package with the 'Wald' parameter.
398
In the analyses of the stage 1 of non-probe sessions, we used a logistic regression analysis in which the 399 independent predictor was whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward or no-reward), and the dependent 400 variable was staying on the same stage 1 action. The p-value of this analysis was used in Figure 3a for colour-coding 401 each bar, and the height of each bar represented the odds ratio calculated as e β . The intercept term of this analysis is 402 shown in Figure A1 . In the analyses of stage 1 of the probe sessions, the independent predictors were transition type 403 of the previous trial (rare or common) and whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward or no-reward), whereas 404 the dependent variable was staying on the same stage 1 action. The effects of interest were reward and the reward by 405 transition-type interaction. In the analysis of stage 2 probe sessions, the independent variables were whether the stage 1 action was repeated (same stage 1), and whether the previous trial was rewarded. The dependent variable 407 was staying on the same stage 2 action. The effect of interest was the interaction between the two independent 408 14/36 variables. Note that only trials in which the stage 2 state was different from the stage 2 state of the previous trial 409 were included in this analysis.
410
In all the analyses, only trials in which subjects made a correct discrimination on the previous trial ('R' in S2, and 411 'L' in S1) were included (%71 of trials in the whole training period). This was for two reasons. Firstly, it was not 412 clear how subjects learn from actions taken during incorrect discriminations, which were never rewarded. Secondly, as 413 depicted in Figure 3c , for the analysis of adaptive action representation, we focused on the trials in which the stage 2 414
states was different from that of the previous trial. When executing action sequences, we expected the subject to take 415 the same stage 2 action in the next trial if (i) they were rewarded in the previous trial and (ii) they take the same 416 stage 1 action, but not otherwise (as we focused on consecutive trials with different stage 2 states). However, assume 417 that the subject makes an incorrect discrimination in the previous trial, e.g., it takes action 'L' at stage 1, moves to 418 state S2 and takes action 'L' in that state, which is not rewarded since action 'L' in S2 is never rewarded. In the next 419 trial, if the subject takes action 'L' again and ends up in state S1 (Figure 3c ), there is a high chance that it will take 420 'L' again at stage 2, since 'R' is never rewarded in S1. Therefore, even if no reward was earned in the previous trial, 421
there is a high chance that the subject will repeat the same stage 2 action in a different trial. This only happens in 422 the condition that the subject made an incorrect discrimination in the previous trial, and in order to remove this 423 interaction between the discrimination between actions at stage 2, and the analysis of action sequences, we only 424 included the trials in which the subjects made correct discrimination in the previous trial. The analysis similar to the 425 one presented in Table A3 without removing these trials is presented in Table A4 , which shows that the main 426 statistical tests that we used to argue for adaptive state-space and action representations are statistically significant 427
whether we include all of the trials or not. addition to these families, we also considered a family of hierarchical models (corresponding to the H family) in which 432 only action sequences were available at stage 1 (i.e., single actions 'L' and 'R' were not available). In addition to the 433 free-parameters mentioned in previous work, we added two new parameters here. The first free-parameter only 434 applies to the hierarchical families (H, H-MB), which represented the probability that the performance of action 435 sequences is interrupted in the middle of the action sequence (i.e., subjects only perform the first component of an 436
action sequence, and select a new action at stage 2). The other free-parameter coded the tendency of animals to take 437 the discriminative action at stage 2, irrespective of the value of each action (tendency to take 'R' in S2 and 'L' in S1). 438
This free-parameter allowed the model to learn that one of the actions in each of the stage 2 states was never RL and model-free RL family (MB-MF). Each family had several instances, that we described them below.
563
We assumed that the environment has five states; the initial state denoted by S 0 , stage 2 states denoted by S 1 and 564 S 2 , the reward state denoted by S Re and no-reward state denoted by S NR . For the case of non-hierarchical models, 565
we assumed that actions L and R are available in states S 0 , S 1 and S 2 , and for the case of hierarchical models, we 566 19/36 assumed actions L, R, LR, LL, RL, and RR are available in states S 0 , and actions L and R, are available in states S 1 567 and S 2 . .) ), and the reward function (R(.)). We denote the transition function with T (s |a, s) which is the probability of reaching state s after executing action a in state s. We assume that the transition function at the first stage is fixed,
and it will not change during learning. For the other states, after executing action a in state s and reaching state s , the transition function updates as follows:
where η(0 < η < 1) is the update rate of the state-action-state transitions. For the reward functions, we assumed that 570 the reward at state S Re is one, and zero in all other states, 
Based on the above reward and transition functions, the goal-directed (model-based) value of taking action a in 572 state s is as follows:
where:
Finally, the agent uses the calculated values to choose actions. The probability of selecting action a in state s, 575 denoted by π(s, a), will be determined according to the soft-max rule: 
The above equation reflects the fact that actions with higher values are more likely to be selected. The β(s) 577 parameter controls the rate of exploration; the parameter κ(s, a) is the action preservation parameter and captures 578 the general tendency of taking the same action as the previous trial Ito and Doya (2009); Lau and Glimcher (2005) . 579
20/36
Finally, the term d(s, a) represents the tendency of the subjects to take the discriminative actions at the stage 2 states (taking action R in S 2 and action L in S 1 ). A positive value for this parameter entails that a subject has a 581 tendency to take the discriminative action at stage 2 states. Please note that the effect of this parameter is on top of 582 the effect of values of the actions at the stage 2 states.
583
For the exploration parameter, we assume that β(s) = β 1 if s = S 0 and β(s) = β 2 if s ∈ {S 1 , S 2 }. For the 584 perseveration parameter we assumed that if s = S 0 and a being the action taken in the previous trial in the S 0 state, 585 then κ(s, a) = k, otherwise it will be zero. Finally, for the discrimination parameter, we assume
In the most general form, all the parameters (β 1 , β 2 , η, k, φ) were treated as free parameters. We also generated 587 eight variants by (1) setting β 1 = β 2 (i.e., rate of exploration at stage 1 and stage 2 states are the same), (2) setting 588 k = 0 (there is no tendency to perseverate on the previously taken actions), and (3) setting φ = 0 (there is no 589 tendency to take the discriminative action at stage 2). 
As before, κ(s, a) captures action perseveration. We assumed that κ(s, a) = k 1 if action a is a single action, and 602 κ(s, a) = k 2 if action a is an action sequence: d(s, a) is similar to the one defined in the previous section.
604
For calculating the probability of selecting each action, equation 5 was used in the case of stage 1 actions, as these 605
actions are chosen using using model-based valuation. In the case of stage 2 actions, however, the probability of 606 selecting actions depends on whether the action to be executed is part an action sequence selected earlier, or is it a 607 single action selected at stage 2 based on the model-based valuations at this stage, i.e., if the action selected at stage 608 1 is a single action then the action at stage 2 will be selected using equation 5, however, if the action selected at stage 609 1 is an action sequence, then the second component of the selected action sequence will be executed in stage 2. Based 610 on this, we calculated the probabilities of selecting actions at stage 2 as follows. Assume we know action L has been 611 executed in state S 0 by the subject; then, the probability of this action being due to performing the LR action 612 sequence is:
Similarly, the probability of observing L due to selecting the single action L at stage 1 is:
Based on this, the probability that the model assigns to action a in state s ∈ {S 1 , S 2 }, given that action a is 615 being observed in S 0 is: 616 p(a|s) = p(a |S 0 , a )π(a|s) + p(a a|S 0 , a ),
where p(aa |S 0 , a ) and p(a |S 0 , a ) are calculated using equations 12 and 13 respectively.
617
Next, we assumed that even under the conditions in which an action sequence is being executed, there is a chance 618 that the performance of the action sequence will be interrupted at stage 2, that is, a subject selects an action 619 sequence at stage 1, but stops executing the action sequence at stage 2, and selects a new action using model-based 620 evaluations (equation 5). This variant is inspired by similar approaches in the hierarchical RL literature (see Hengst 621
(2012) for a review).
622
Let's assume that the probability of interrupting an action sequence is I, then equation 14 will become as follows: 623 p(a|s) = π(a|s) p(a |S 0 , a )(1 − I) + I + (1 − I)p(a a|S 0 , a ).
It can be verified that in the case of I = 0, i.e., action sequences never become interrupted, the above equation will 624 degenerate to equation 14. In the case of I = 1, i.e., all the action sequences are interrupted and they have no effect 625 on stage 2 choices, and we have:
22/36 which indicates that the probability of taking each action at stage 2 is guided only by the rewards earned on that 627 stage 2, and not by the action sequences in the first stage.
628
In the most general form, all the free parameters are included in the model: β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , η 1 , η 2 , k 1 , k 2 , φ, I. We 629 generated 256 simpler models by setting (1) β 1 = β 2 (exploration rates at stage 1 and stage 2 choices are the same), 630
(2) β 1 = β 3 (exploration rates for action sequences and single actions are the same), (3) η 1 = η 3 (learning rates for 631 action sequences and single actions are the same), (4) k 1 = 0 (no perseveration for single actions), (5) k 2 = 0 (no 632 perseveration for action sequences), (6) φ = 0 (no tendency to take discriminative actions), (7) I = 1 (action 633 sequences are always interrupted), (8) I = 0 (action sequences are never interrupted).
634
A1.3 Hierarchical (H) 635
This family is similar to H-MB family, except that only action sequences (LL, LR, RL, RR) can be selected at stage 1 636 (S 0 ). In the most general form the free-parameters included β 1 (exploration parameter at stage 1), β 2 (exploration 637 parameter at stage 2), η 1 (learning rate for action/action sequences), k 2 (preservation on action sequences), φ 638 (discrimination parameter), I (sequence interruption parameter). We then generated 16 different variants by setting 639 β 1 = β 2 , k 2 = 0, φ = 0, I = 0. 
where α(s)(0 < α(s) < 1) is the learning rate, which can be different in stage 1 and stage 2 states,
In equation 17, V MF (s) is the value of the best action in state s:
In addition to the update in equation 17 after taking actions at stage 2, the value of the action that was taken at 646 stage 1 will also get updated according to the outcome. Assume a is the action that was taken in S 0 , a is the action 647 that was subsequently taken in s (second stage states, i.e., s ∈ {S 0 , S 1 }), and s is the state that was visited after 648 executing a (s ∈ {S Re,NR }). Then, action values update as follows:
where λ(0 < λ < 1) is the reinforcement eligibility parameter, and it determines the extent to which the first stage 650 23/36 action values are affected by receiving the outcome after executing the second stage actions. The action selection method, and variants of this form of learning are described in the next section. 
were w(0 < w < 1) determines the relative contribution of model-free and model-based values into the final values. 656
The probability of selecting action a in state s will be determined according to the soft-max rule: 
where parameters are same as the ones we described in the Model-based RL (MB) section.
658
In the most general form, all the free parameters are included in the model: β 1 , β 2 , η, α 1 , λ, w, k, φ (we assumed 659 that α 2 = η). We generated 32 simpler models by setting (1) λ = 0, (2) α 1 = α 2 (learning rate of model-free system 660 is the same at stage 1 and stage 2 states), (3) β 1 = β 2 (rate of exploration is the same at stage 1 and stage 2 states), 661
(4) k = 0 (there is no tendency to perseverate on the previously taken action), and (5) φ = 0 (there is no tendency to 662 take the discriminative action at stage 2).
663
By setting w = 0 the above hybrid model degenerated to a model-free process described in the previous section, 664
and therefore, we generated 32 variants of model-free RL (similar to the hybrid model), by setting w = 0.
665
A1.6 Model comparison 666
We took a hierarchical Bayesian approach to compare different models. This approach provides a framework to 667 compare models based on their complexity and their fit to data. Bayesian model comparison is based on the model 668 evidence quantity, which is the probability of the data given a model. The approach that we took to calculate this 669 quantity is similar to the approach taken in Piray et al. (2014) .
670
For each model, there are two sets of free parameters: group-level parameters denoted by Θ (we call these 671 parameters hyper-parameters), and subject-level parameters, denoted with θ i for subject i. The hyper-parameters 672 define the prior distribution over subject-level parameters. The aim is to calculate the probability of data (denoted 673
by D) given model M :
Since the above integral is intractable, we approximate it using Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz,
:
where Θ ML is the maximum-likelihood estimate of Θ, and D i is the data of subject i. |Θ| is the number of 677 24/36 hyper-parameters, and |D| is the sum of number of choices made by all the subjects. In the above formula, the term 678 inside the sum is:
which is again intractable to compute, and we use Laplace method (MacKay, 2003) to approximate it: The only remaining question is how to calculate Θ ML , which is:
The aim of this section is to present the results of three supplementary experiments (1-3) conducted using different 705 parameters to the ones used for the experiment reported in the main paper. Each experiment shows that similar to 706 Figure 3a there was a shift in the pattern of choices from simple representations to more complex representations that 707 reflect the correct structure of the environment. In addition to this, we also report the results of the probe sessions 708 conducted in these experiments. Those results reveal how the pattern of choices is affected by the variations in the 709 parameters.
710
The parameters used in these experiments are different from the parameters used in the main paper in two 711 respects. Firstly, the inter-trial interval (ITI) in these supplementary experiments was non-zero, whereas the ITI in 712 the experiment reported in the main paper was zero. Secondly, in the supplementary experiments auditory cues 713 (clicker and tone) were used to signal stage 2 states, whereas in the experiments reported in the main paper visual 714 cues were used to signal stage 2 states. See Behavioural procedures below for the details of the parameters used in 715 each experiment.
716
In the supplementary experiments, because the ITI was non-zero, the stage 1 state (S0) was explicitly signalled to 717 the animals at the end of the ITI by the illumination of the house light. We assumed that the first response made 718 after the ITI was the state 1 action and the response after that was the stage 2 action (and this is what stage 1 719 actions and stage 2 actions refer to in analysis presented below). The data, however, indicated that animals did not 720 wait for the presentation of the stage 1 state to make their first response and made a significant number of responses 721 during the ITI. These were unrewarded regardless of which action/action sequence was made by the animals. Clearly, 722 this could interfere with the formation and/or expression of action sequences and, therefore, in the experiment 723 reported in the main paper an ITI of zero was used to remove such interference. Furthermore, we used visual cues in 724 the experiment reported in the main paper instead of the auditory cues used in the supplementary experiments. This 725 was because the visual cues (used in the experiment reported in the main paper) are presumably less salient and so 726 harder to discriminate than the auditory cues used in the supplementary experiments; it took twice the number of 727 training sessions for the animals to learn the discrimination between the visual cues compared to the auditory cues 728 (comparing Figure A2 with Figure A3h ). Because of this reduction in slaience, when visual cues were being used less 729 interference was introduced during the transition between states and so there was a higher tendency for the rats to 730 perform the stage 1 and stage 2 actions in a sequence (uninterrupted) independent of the stage 2 states, increasing 731 the opportunity to detect action sequences. For this reason, in the experiment reported in the main paper we used 732 visual cues. The general structure of the experiments was similar to the experiment reported in the main paper and it is depicted 737
in Figure 1 . Below we explain each step and highlight the similarities and differences between the experiments.
738
26/36
Magazine training, lever-press training, and discrimination training phases (phases 1-3) were similar to the experiment reported in the main paper (see section Material and Methods), except that in the supplementary experiments, the stimuli were the tone and clicker, but in the experiment reported in the main paper, the stimuli 741 were a constant and a blinking house light.
742
Next, the rats received training on the two-stage task in which animals first made a binary choice at stage 1 743 (signalled by the illumination of the house light), after which they transitioned to the stage 2 state, in which again 744 they made another binary choice that could lead to either reward delivery or no-reward. In supplementary 745 experiments 1 and 2 there was a 20-s inter-trial interval (ITI) before the next trial started, and there was a 5-second 746 ITI in supplementary experiment 3. Stage 2 states were signalled by the stimuli trained in the previous phase of the 747 experiment. The stage 2 states were presented immediately after stage 1 actions were taken, and the 748 reward/no-reward was presented immediately after the stage 2 action was taken.
749
In each trial, only one of the stage 2 states led to reward, whereas the other state did not lead to reward 750 irrespective of the choice of actions. The stage 2 states that earned a reward frequently switched between states 751 during the course of a session (Figure 2a ). In supplementary experiment 1, this switch occurred after every four 752 outcomes with a maximum 40 outcomes in a session, which later in the training increased to every eight outcomes as 753 shown in Figure A3a (with a maximum 48 outcomes in a session and maximum duration of a session was limited to 754 an hour). In supplementary experiment 2, the switch occurred whenever a randomly selected number of outcomes 755 were received since the last switch. This random number was uniformly drawn from within a range from 8 to 16 756 outcomes (maximum 48 outcomes in a session and maximum duration of a session was limited to an hour). In 757 supplementary experiment 3, the switch occurred every fourth outcome received (maximum 50 outcomes in a session 758 and maximum duration of a session was limited to an hour). Furthermore, because the ITI was long in 759 supplementary experiments 1 and 2, animals received a pre-training phase on the two-stage task in which the reward 760 in the stage 2 states was fixed during a session, and was changed across sessions. Subjects received ten training 761 sessions in this manner. Similarly, in supplementary experiment 2, subjects received two pre-training sessions in 762 which they could earn a reward in both stage 2 states.
763
Animals were trained on the two-stage task for 69 sessions in supplementary experiment 1, 57 sessions in 764 supplementary experiment 2, 60 sessions in supplementary experiment 3. In the middle of, or at the end of these 765 training sessions, animals were given probe test sessions in which stage 1 actions led to stage 2 states in a 766 probabilistic manner. One stage 1 action led to its specific stage 2 state 80% of the time, whereas the other stage 1 767 action led to the other stage 2 state (Figure 2c ). For the last probe session in Experiments 1 and 3, the probability 768 that stage 1 actions led to the corresponding stage 2 states was 50%. The exact positions of probe sessions for 769 supplementary experiments 1 to 3 are depicted in Figures A3b, A4b , A5b respectively marked with an asterisk. were conducted in supplementary experiment 1 (marked with '*' in Figure A3b ) and the statistical analysis of probe 773 sessions are shown in Table A5 . Supplementary experiments 2,3 contained a single probe session (marked with * in 774 Figure A4b , and Figure A5b ), and the statistical analysis of these probe sessions are shown in Table A6 . Note that 775 27/36 the differences in the results of the probe sessions of the supplementary experiments compared to the those reported 776 in the main paper is most likely due to the interference produced by unrewarded actions taken during the ITI (since 777 the ITI was non-zero in the supplementary experiments), and also due to the use of auditory cues in the 778 supplementary experiments (see above).
779
Similar to the experiment reported in main paper, at the beginning of training, as Figure A3a , A4a, A5a show, 780 the rats not only failed to show a tendency to take the same action after earning a reward in the previous trial, they 781 also showed a tendency to switch to the other action. This effect was statistically significant in the first five sessions 782 of supplementary experiment 2 (sessions s20 to s24; β = −0.253 (CI: −0.371, −0.135), SE=0.060, p<10 −4 ) and Table A3 . Results of the logistic regression analysis of stage 1 and stage 2 choices for the experiment reported in the main paper. For the stage 1 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 1 action on the next trial, based on whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward) , and whether the previous trial was common or rare (transition). 'reward:transition' is the interaction between reward, and transition type, and 'intercept' refers to the intercept term. For stage 2 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 2 action, based on staying on the same stage 1 action (stay) and earning a reward in the previous trial (reward). 'reward:stay' is the interaction between 'reward', and 'stay'. 'probe 3' are the results reported in the main paper. Figure A1 . The graphs shows the intercept term for the analysis shown in Figure 3a , which is the odds ratio of staying on the same stage 1 action. The p-value of this analysis (for the intercept term) was used for colour-coding each bar, and the height of each bar represents the odds ratio calculated as e β , in which β is the coefficient obtained for the intercept term. The graphs can be interpreted as the probability of staying on the same stage 1 action, independent of whether reward was earn in the previous trial. The sessions marked with '#' and 'strict sequence' are similar to the sessions described in Figure 3a . Table A4 . Results of the logistic regression analysis of stage 1 and stage 2 choices for the experiment reported in the main paper. For the stage 1 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 1 action on the next trial, based on whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward), and whether the previous trial was common or rare (transition). 'reward:transition' is the interaction between reward, and transition type, and 'intercept' refers to the intercept term. 'correct' means that whether the correct stage 1 action was taken in the previous trial. 'correct' stage 1 action in refers to the stage 1 action which led the rewarded stage 2 state. For stage 2 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 2 action, based on staying on the same stage 1 action (stay) and earning a reward in the previous trial (reward). 'reward:stay' is the interaction between 'reward', and 'stay'. This table is different from Table A3 in two aspects: (i) the 'correct' predictor was added to the analysis following Akam et al. (2015) suggestion, (ii) unlike the analysis performed in Table A3 , the trials in which subjects did not make the correct discrimination were not excluded from the analysis. Note that the aborted trial, i.e., the trials in which animals entered the magazine between stage 1 and stage 2 actions were excluded. The reason for this second difference is, since rewards are deterministic (within each reversal), if we only include trials in which animals make correct discrimination, then 'reward-transition' predictor, and 'correct' predictor will be identical. As such, in this analysis that 'correct' is a predictor, we included all the trials.
Stage 1 Table A5 . Results of the logistic regression analysis of stage 1, and stage 2 choices in supplementary experiment 1. For the stage 1 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 1 action on the next trial based on whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward) and whether the previous trial was common or rare (transition). 'reward:transition' is the interaction between reward, and transition type. For stage 2 choices, the analysis focuses on staying on the same stage 2 action, based on staying on the same stage 1 action (stay), and earning a reward on the previous trial (reward). 'reward:stay' is the interaction between 'reward', and 'stay'. 'p' refers to p-value. For the last probe session (s94) since the pattern of choices was not stationary but changing during the session, we presented separately the analysis for the first 16 earned outcomes during the sessions (s94:1; outcomes 1:16), second 16 outcomes earned during the session (s94:2; outcomes 17:32), and third 16 outcomes earned during the session (s94:3; outcomes 33:48 Table A6 . Results of the logistic regression analysis of stage 1 and stage 2 choices in supplementary experiments 2 and 3. For the stage 1 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 1 action on the next trial, based on whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward), and whether the previous trial was common or rare (transition). 'reward:transition' is the interaction between reward, and transition type. For stage 2 choices, the analysis is focused on staying on the same stage 2 action, based on staying on the same stage 1 action (stay) and earning a reward in the previous trial (reward). 'reward:stay' is the interaction between 'reward', and 'stay'. Figure A3 . Supplementary experiment 1. In this experiment several probe sessions were inserted in the middle of the training sessions in order illustrate the development of actions over the training period. (a) Odds ratio of the probability of staying on the same stage 1 action after getting rewarded on the previous trial. Odds ratio=1 implies an equal preference for both actions. Sessions marked with '*' are the probe sessions which included both rare and common transitions. (b-f) The probability of staying on the same stage 1 action in the probe sessions, averaged over subjects, as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward), and whether the transition in the previous trial was common or rare. The graphs illustrate a gradual shift from a simple state-space representation (panel b) to reward-guided actions (panels c,d), to goal-directed choices (panel e), and finally to a mixture of goal-directed and automatic actions (panel f). (g) Stage 2 actions in session s78. The graph shows the probability of staying on the same stage 2 action, averaged over subjects, as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward), and whether subjects stayed on the same stage 1 action (stay/switch). Similar to the analysis of the experiment reported in the main paper, only trials in which the stage 2 state is different from the previous trial are included in panel (g) in order to detect the performance of action sequences. Similarly, only trials in which subjects made a correct discrimination on the previous trial ('R' in S2, and 'L' in S1) were included in panels (a-g; see text). In all the probe sessions, the probability of rare transitions was 80%, except for the last session (s94) in which the probability of common and rare transitions was equal (i.e., 50%), in order to establish the effect of the transition probabilities on actions. Figure A4 . Supplementary experiment 2. (a) The odds ratio of staying on the same stage 1 action after earning a reward on the previous trial over the odds after earning no reward. Sessions denoted by 'all rare' included only rare transitions (similar to sessions marked with '#' in Figure 3a ). (b) The probability of staying on the same stage 1 action in the probe session (session s76) as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward) and whether the transition in the previous trial was common or rare. (c) The probability of staying on the same stage 2 action in the probe session (session s76), as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward) and whether subjects stayed on the same stage 1 action (stay/switch). Similar to the analysis in the main paper, only trials in which the stage 2 state was different from the previous trial are included in panels (c) in order to detect the performance of action sequences. Similarly, only trials in which subjects made a correct discrimination on the previous trial ('R' in S2, and 'L' in S1) were included in panels (a-c). In all the probe sessions the probability of rare transitions was 50%. Figure A5 . Supplementary experiment 3. (a) The odds ratio of staying on the same stage 1 action after earning a reward on the previous trial over the odds after earning no reward. Sessions denoted by 'all rare' included only rare transitions (similar to sessions marked with '#' in Figure 3a) . 'strict sequences' indicates that trials with magazine responses after stage 1 actions were aborted. (b) The probability of staying on the same stage 1 action in the probe session (session s74) as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward), and whether the transition in the previous trial was common or rare. (c) The probability of staying on the same stage 2 action in the probe session (session s74), as a function of whether the previous trial was rewarded (reward/no reward), and whether subjects stayed on the same stage 1 action (stay/switch). Similar to the analysis presented in the main paper, only trials in which the stage 2 states were different from the previous trial are included in panels (c) in order to detect the performance of action sequences. Similar to the analysis in the main paper, only trials in which subjects made a correct discrimination on the previous trial ('R' in S2, and 'L' in S1) were included in panels (a-c). In the probe sessions, the probability of rare transitions was 50%. 
